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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
States often provide economic incentives, such as tax 
breaks or grants, to businesses willing to relocate, with the 
understanding that these businesses will create new jobs and 
otherwise improve the state’s economy.  This tax case involves 
one such incentive program, under which the State of New 
Jersey provided cash grants, without any restrictions on how 
that cash could be used, to companies willing to relocate or 
expand there and create a certain number of high-paying jobs 
in the State.   
At issue is whether those grants are “contribution[s] to 
the capital of the [company]” under Section 118 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 118(a), as it existed at the relevant 
time, such that they are excluded from the company’s taxable 
income.  The Tax Court held that they are, concluding that $56 
million in cash grants to a financial services company, 
Appellee BrokerTec Holdings, Inc. (“BrokerTec”), were 
contributions to its capital, not taxable income.  We reverse and 
hold that—because the State did not restrict how BrokerTec 
could use the cash, and because the grants were calculated 
based on the amount of income tax revenue that the new jobs 
would generate—the grants were taxable income, not 
contributions to capital.1 
 
1 As we note below, Congress has since amended § 118 
to exclude from the definition of a contribution to capital 




The relevant facts—as found by the Tax Court 
following a bench trial—are undisputed.  In 1996, the State of 
New Jersey created the Business Employment Incentive 
Program (the “Incentive Program”) to “grow New Jersey’s 
economy and revitalize its cities through providing financial 
. . . assistance to businesses,” specifically cash grants for 
companies willing to relocate or expand to New Jersey.  
BrokerTec Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, No. 3573-17, 2019 WL 
1545724, at *3 (T.C. Apr. 9, 2019).  For a company to be 
eligible for Incentive Program grants, three conditions must be 
satisfied: (1) the relocation or expansion would create a net 
increase in employment in the State; (2) the project would be 
economically sound and of benefit to the people of New Jersey 
by increasing employment and strengthening the State’s 
economy; and (3) the receipt of the grants would be material to 
the company’s decision to undertake the relocation or 
expansion.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:1B-126.   
Beyond these criteria, the Incentive Program was 
discretionary.  A company seeking grants could apply to New 
Jersey’s Economic Development Authority (the “Development 
Authority”), which administered the Incentive Program.  It 
would evaluate applications using various criteria, including 
the number, type, and duration of new jobs to be created; the 
type of contribution the business could make to the long-term 
growth of the State’s economy; the amount of other financial 
assistance the business would receive from the State; and the 
total amount of money the company would invest in the 
project.   
A company receiving the grants would be required to 
maintain a minimum number of employees and remain at the 
new location for a certain time period.  But no restrictions were 
placed on how the company could use the grant money.  The 
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amount the company would receive was a set percentage of 
state income taxes withheld from the wages of the company’s 
employees at the new location.  That percentage varied from 
30% to 80% of tax withholdings.  Larger grants would be 
provided to businesses creating jobs in certain municipalities 
in particular need of investment as well as businesses in certain 
targeted industries.  The grants would not be paid until the 
recipient had completed the project and begun to pay wages, 
and until it could be confirmed that the amount of state income 
tax withheld from those wages had met or exceeded the amount 
of the proposed grant.  This ensured that the grants would 
generate more revenue for the State than they cost.   
The grant recipients here are two subsidiaries of 
BrokerTec: Garban Intercapital North America, Inc. 
(“Garban”) and First Brokers Holdings, Inc. (“First Brokers”).  
Garban’s offices in the World Trade Center were destroyed, 
and First Brokers’ nearby offices were rendered uninhabitable, 
in the attacks of September 11, 2001.  Seeking new office 
space, BrokerTec learned about the Incentive Program and, 
soon after the attacks, submitted applications to the 
Development Authority to relocate both Garban and First 
Brokers across the Hudson River to New Jersey.   
BrokerTec certified it would employ a combined 720 
full-time workers at its relocated office spaces.  It also noted 
that it would make more than $47 million in improvements to 
the raw office space it was leasing, as well as acquire more than 
$25 million in technology, furniture, and other equipment.  But 
it was not required under the terms of the Incentive Program to 
make those expenditures to receive grants.  What was required 
was that it create a minimum number of jobs, and hence a 
minimum amount of income tax revenue, for the State.     
In 2002, BrokerTec’s applications were approved, and 
both Garban and First Brokers entered into agreements with 
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the Development Authority for a 10-year period of Incentive 
Program grants.  Garban’s grants would amount to 80% of its 
employees’ state income tax withholdings, and First Brokers’ 
would amount to 70%, as it created fewer jobs than Garban. 
The State began to make grant payments in 2004, after 
BrokerTec had started to pay employees.  Over the next 
decade, Garban received over $147 million, and First Brokers 
received $22 million, for a total of approximately $170 million.  
It used those funds to purchase stock in a wholly owned 
subsidiary, ICAP Holdings (USA), Inc., as “part of a series of 
transactions designed to expand [its] business into other 
trading markets.”  BrokerTec Holdings, Inc., 2019 WL 
1545724, at *6. 
During the four tax years at issue here, 2010 to 2013, 
BrokerTec’s tax returns (consolidated with the returns for its 
subsidiaries, Garban and First Brokers) excluded 
approximately $56 million in Incentive Program grant 
payments as non-taxable, non-shareholder contributions to 
capital under 26 U.S.C. § 118.  The Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue concluded that the grants were taxable income and, 
accordingly, issued BrokerTec a deficiency notice for the 
difference in taxes.  It petitioned the Tax Court for review. 
The Tax Court held a bench trial at which it heard from 
witnesses—including Development Authority staff—and 
considered the parties’ stipulations.  Following the trial, the 
Court issued an opinion agreeing with BrokerTec that the 
grants were capital contributions and thereby excluded from 
taxable income.  See BrokerTec Holdings, Inc., 2019 WL 
1545724, at *7–15.  The Court reasoned that, because New 
Jersey provided the Incentive Program grants to BrokerTec as 
an inducement for it to relocate its business there, they “fall 
squarely within the four corners” of a Treasury Regulation 
interpreting § 118.  Id. at *13.  That Regulation provides, as an 
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example of a contribution to capital, “the value of land or other 
property contributed to a corporation by a governmental unit 
or by a civic group for the purpose of inducing the corporation 
to locate its business in a particular community.”  26 C.F.R. § 
1.118-1 (emphasis added).  The Court added that, consistent 
with this regulation, “[t]he circumstances surrounding the 
[Incentive Program grant] payments [were] substantially 
similar to those” in Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 339 U.S. 
583 (1950), and Commissioner v. McKay Products Corp., 178 
F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1949), both of which involved relocation 
incentives provided to businesses by local governments or 
community groups.  BrokerTec Holdings, 2019 WL 1545724, 
at *15.  Thus, the Court concluded, the Incentive Program 
grants “manifest the definite purpose of enlarging the working 
capital of [BrokerTec]” and were therefore contributions to 
capital, not taxable income.  Id.  The Commissioner appeals to 
us. 
II.2 
We first consider the appropriate standard of review.  
BrokerTec contends that the Tax Court’s conclusion that New 
Jersey intended to make a contribution to BrokerTec’s capital 
is a factual finding, and hence subject to review under the 
deferential clear-error standard.  The Commissioner responds 
that, “to the extent that the Tax Court found as a factual matter 
that New Jersey intended to make a capital contribution, that 
conclusory determination is nevertheless subject to plenary 
review because the court focused on the wrong facts and 
erroneously viewed the law.”  Reply Br. 4. 
 
2 The Tax Court had jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 6213(a), 6214, and 7442.  We have jurisdiction to review 
the Tax Court’s decision under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). 
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The Tax Court’s conclusions as to motive and intent are 
generally factual findings, subject to clear-error review.  See 
Bedrosian v. United States, 912 F.3d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(“[W]e have held that the Tax Court’s determination of 
willfulness in tax matters is reviewed for clear error.” (citation 
omitted)); Smith v. Comm’r, 305 F.2d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 1962) 
(reviewing for clear error the Tax Court’s conclusion that a 
payment was intended as a gift, turning on a finding as to the 
transferor’s motive).  But “[e]ven when we review a trial 
court’s primarily factual determination under a deferential 
standard of review, we nonetheless have a duty to ‘correct any 
legal error infecting [the] decision.’”  Bedrosian, 912 F.3d at 
152 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex 
rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 
138 S. Ct. 960, 968 (2018)); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers 
Union, 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984) (holding that the clear-error 
standard “does not inhibit an appellate court’s power to correct 
errors of law, including . . . a finding of fact that is predicated 
on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of law”). 
For the reasons set out below, we agree with the 
Commissioner that the Tax Court’s finding was predicated on 
a misunderstanding of Internal Revenue Code § 118 as well as 
the Treasury Regulation and cases interpreting the statutory 
provision.  Specifically, the Tax Court appears to have 
understood these authorities to hold that, where a government 
provides a company cash as a relocation inducement, its intent 
to contribute to the company’s capital is shown—even where 
the government places no restrictions on how the cash can be 
used nor calculates the amount of cash provided on the basis of 
the company’s investment in capital assets.  In doing so, the 




The Internal Revenue Code sets out a broad definition 
of “gross income,” providing that, except where excluded by 
another provision, it “means all income from whatever source 
derived.”  26 U.S.C. § 61(a).  In light of this broad definition, 
the Supreme Court has held that “exclusions from income must 
be narrowly construed.”  Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 
328 (1995) (citation omitted). 
 
The exclusion at issue here, 26 U.S.C. § 118, provided 
at the relevant time that, where the taxpayer is a corporation, 
“gross income does not include any contribution to the capital 
of the [corporation].”  § 118(a).  The section does not define 
“contribution to . . . capital,” but, as the Treasury Regulation 
interpreting § 118 makes clear, it includes not only 
contributions from the corporation’s shareholders, but from 
others as well, including government entities.  See 26 C.F.R. 
§ 1.118-1 (noting that “Section 118 also applies to 
contributions to capital made by persons other than 
shareholders,” including those by “a governmental unit or a 
civic group”).3  In determining whether a transfer is income or 
a contribution to capital, we consider “the intent or motive of 
the transferor,” not “the use to which the assets transferred 
were applied, [n]or . . . the economic and business 
 
3 In 2017, however, Congress amended § 118 to exclude 
from the definition of “contribution to . . . capital . . . any 
contribution by any governmental entity . . . (other than a 
contribution made by a shareholder as such).”  26 U.S.C. 
§ 118(b)(2); Tax Cuts & Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 
§ 13312, 131 Stat. 2054, 2132–33 (2017).  But because the tax 
years at issue here precede the passage of this legislation, it 
does not apply.  The Treasury Regulation, 26 C.F.R. § 1.118-
1, has not yet been amended to reflect this change to the Code. 
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consequences for the transferee corporation.”  United States v. 
Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. (“CB&Q”), 412 U.S. 401, 
411 (1973) (emphases added). 
 
About this much the parties agree.  They disagree, 
however, as to what circumstances indicate a transferor’s intent 
to make a contribution to capital.  As noted above, the Tax 
Court relied—as BrokerTec does here—on the Treasury 
Regulation, which sets out examples of when a transfer is a 
contribution to capital and when it is not: 
 
For example, the [contribution-to-capital] 
exclusion applies to the value of land or other 
property contributed to a corporation by a 
governmental unit or by a civic group for the 
purpose of inducing the corporation to locate its 
business in a particular community, or for the 
purpose of enabling the corporation to expand its 
operating facilities.  However, the exclusion 
does not apply to any money or property 
transferred to the corporation in consideration 
for goods or services rendered, or to subsidies 
paid for the purpose of inducing the taxpayer to 
limit production. 
  
26 C.F.R. § 1.118-1 (emphasis added). 
 
 As noted above, the Tax Court concluded that New 
Jersey’s Incentive Program grants “fall squarely within the 
four corners” of the Regulation because the grants were made 
to induce BrokerTec to relocate there.  BrokerTec Holdings, 
Inc., 2019 WL 1545724, at *13.  The Commissioner argues 
that this oversimplifies the analysis and that, while a relocation 
inducement provided by the state may be a contribution to 
capital, it is not necessarily so.  He maintains that even 
relocation-inducement payments must meet two tests: (1) the 
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payments must, in some way, be restricted to use as capital, 
and not be available for the payment of operational expenses 
(like wages) or dividends; and (2) the payments may not be 
direct compensation for services rendered by the company.  
The Commissioner derives these two tests, respectively, from 
the first two “characteristics” of a non-shareholder contribution 
to capital set out by the Supreme Court in CB&Q: (1) the 
contribution “certainly must become a permanent part of the 
transferee’s working capital structure”; and (2) “[i]t may not be 
compensation, such as a direct payment for a specific, 
quantifiable service provided for the transferor by the 
transferee.”  412 U.S. at 413.4 
 
The Commissioner maintains the Incentive Program 
grants fail both tests.  As to the first test, the payments were 
 
4 The Supreme Court identified three other 
“characteristics” of a non-shareholder contribution to capital 
under § 118: (3) “[i]t must be bargained for;” (4) “[t]he asset 
transferred foreseeably must result in benefit to the transferee 
in an amount commensurate with its value;” and (5) “the asset 
ordinarily, if not always, will be employed in or contribute to 
the production of additional income and its value assured in 
that respect.”  CB&Q, 412 U.S. at 413.   
 
While CB&Q refers to these as “characteristics,” the 
mandatory language in the first four—“must” and “may not”—
indicates that these are requirements for a transfer to be a 
contribution to capital.  See AT&T, Inc. v. United States, 629 
F.3d 505, 513 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that “for a court to hold 
that a transfer was a capital contribution, each of the first four, 
and ordinarily the fifth, characteristics [from CB&Q] must . . . 
be satisfied”). 
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unrestricted and could be used for any purpose.  While they 
could be used to acquire a capital asset, they could also be used 
to pay operating expenses like wages, or even to pay dividends.  
Moreover, the amount of the grants was not calculated based 
on the amount of capital investments BrokerTec agreed to 
make; rather they were calculated based on the amount of 
wages it paid to its employees.  As for the second test, the 
Commissioner argues that the Incentive Program grants were 
compensation for services BrokerTec provided to New 
Jersey—namely, additional income tax revenue generated by 
its employees.   
 
BrokerTec responds that the Commissioner’s tests 
misstate the law.  The first test, it contends, would require that 
a grant’s use be limited to the acquisition of “hard assets” such 
as machinery or other property, a limitation neither the 
Treasury Regulation nor the cases support.  BrokerTec Br. 26, 
46.  As to the second test, BrokerTec maintains that, where a 
government provides grants to encourage economic 
development and the benefits that come with new jobs and 
increased tax revenue, the benefits are indirect and speculative, 
such that they cannot be considered compensation for services 
rendered. 
 
We agree with the Commissioner’s first argument, and 
thus need not consider the second.5  To be a non-shareholder 
contribution to capital, even a relocation inducement “must 
become a permanent part of the transferee’s working capital 
 
5 The Commissioner offers two other arguments in 
support of reversal that we also need not reach here: (1) that 
the fourth and fifth CB&Q characteristics were not present, and 
(2) that BrokerTec is barred from contesting the Tax Court’s 
conclusion regarding New Jersey’s intent by the “duty of 
consistency,” Reply Br. 21–22.    
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structure.”  CB&Q, 412 U.S. at 413.  And, as discussed in 
greater detail below, a review of the Supreme Court’s and our 
cases preceding CB&Q indicates this is not so where, as here, 
cash grants were provided without any restrictions on their use.   
IV. 
The Supreme Court first considered whether a 
government payment to a corporation was a non-shareholder 
contribution to capital in Edwards v. Cuba Railroad Company, 
268 U.S. 628 (1925).  There, the Cuban government paid a 
railroad company to construct and operate a railroad line in 
Cuba—specifically, $6,000 per kilometer, which amounted to 
about one-third of the cost of construction.  Id. at 629–30.  In 
addition, the government also provided the company with 
buildings and equipment.  Id. at 630.  The Commissioner 
argued that the cash payments were income.  Id. at 632.  The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument, concluding that the cash 
payments, along with the buildings and equipment, were 
contributions to the railroad’s capital.  See id. at 633.  As it 
explained, that “[t]he subsidy payments were proportionate to 
mileage completed . . . indicat[ed] a purpose to reimburse [the 
company] for capital expenditures.”  Id. at 632.  The Court 
added that nothing in the agreements between the railroad and 
the government “indicate[d] that the money subsidies were to 
be used for the payment of dividends, interest or anything else 
properly chargeable to or payable out of earnings or income.”  
Id. at 633. 
 
The Commissioner contends that Edwards supports his 
position that, to constitute contributions to capital, government 
payments must, in some way, be restricted to use as capital and 
cannot be available for use in paying dividends or operating 
expenses.  We agree.  While the Cuban government did not 
explicitly restrict the use of the cash payments, the Court 
specifically noted that the payments amounted only to “one-
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third of the cost of the railroad,” id. at 630, indicating that they 
were a “reimburs[ment]” for capital expenditures, id. at 632, 
rather than “money subsidies . . . to be used for the payment of 
dividends, interest or anything else properly chargeable to or 
payable out of earnings or income,” id. at 632–33.   
 
Seven years later, in Texas & Pacific Railway Company 
v. United States, 286 U.S. 285 (1932), the Supreme Court had 
nearly the opposite facts as those in Edwards.  The case 
involved payments made to a railroad company by the federal 
Government, under a statute that placed the railroad under 
government control during wartime.  Id. at 287–88.  The statute 
“guarantee[d] a ‘minimum operating income’ [to the railroad 
company] for six months after relinquishment of federal 
control.”  Id. at 288 (citation omitted).  In contrast to the 
payments by the Cuban government in Edwards, the Court 
explained, the federal Government’s payments “were to be 
measured by a deficiency in [the railroad company’s] operating 
income,” and “might be used [by the railroad company] for the 
payment of dividends, of operating expenses, of capital 
charges, or for any other purpose within the corporate 
authority, just as any other operating revenue might be 
applied.”  Id. at 290.  Thus, the Court concluded, the payments 
were not contributions to capital but income to the railroad.  
See id. 
 
Read together, Texas & Pacific Railway and Edwards 
suggest that unrestricted government payments to a company 
reveal an intent to provide the company additional income 
rather than a contribution to the company’s capital.  Plus, 
calculating payments based on the company’s income, rather 
than on the amount of some capital investment made by the 
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company, further indicates an intent to provide income rather 
than a contribution to capital. 
 
In 1943, the Supreme Court first took up a case 
illustrating the second characteristic of a contribution to capital 
later described in CB&Q—that it not be compensation for 
services rendered.  See Detroit Edison Co. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 
98, 99–103 (1943).  It involved an electric utility company that 
would extend electric lines to certain areas only where the 
customers in those areas paid the costs for the extension.  Id. at 
99.  Funds that a customer paid for this purpose would go into 
the utility company’s general fund but would not be earmarked 
specifically for construction of the lines.  Id. at 100.  The Court 
rejected the utility’s argument that the customers’ payments 
were non-shareholder contributions to capital, explaining that, 
because “[t]he payments were to the customer the price of 
service,” they were income to the utility company.  Id. at 103. 
 
Neither Edwards, Texas & Pacific Railway, nor Detroit 
Edison involved payments made to induce a company to 
relocate—like the grants at issue here.  But even before the 
Supreme Court had occasion to apply those principles in such 
a case, we did so in Commissioner v. McKay Products Corp., 
178 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1949).  There townspeople formed a 
nonprofit company and raised funds to bring an industry to the 
town.  Id. at 640.  The nonprofit purchased a factory building 
and offered it for use by a company, McKay Products, agreeing 
to deed the factory over once it had paid out $5 million in 
wages.  Id. at 640 n.2.  McKay Products argued the factory was 
a contribution to its capital, rather than income, and we agreed, 
distinguishing Detroit Edison as a case in which the “payments 
were part of the price of the service.”  Id. at 643. 
 
Less than a year after we decided McKay Products, the 
Supreme Court took up the same issue in Brown Shoe Co. v. 
Commissioner, 339 U.S. 583 (1950).  Community groups in 
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twelve different towns sought to have Brown Shoe establish a 
factory, or enlarge an existing one, within the community.  Id. 
at 586.  And to that end, the community groups provided 
inducements to Brown Shoe, including both land and cash for 
the production or enlargement of a factory.  Id.  The Court cited 
McKay Products approvingly, and distinguished Detroit 
Edison on the same basis, explaining that the communities had 
not paid Brown Shoe for services rendered.  Id. at 589–91.  
Rather, they “could [not] have anticipated any direct service or 
recompense whatever, their only expectation being that [their] 
contributions might prove advantageous to the community at 
large.”  Id. at 591.  “Under these circumstances,” the Court 
concluded, “the transfers manifested a definite purpose to 
enlarge the working capital of the company.”  Id. 
 
In our case, the Tax Court concluded—and BrokerTec 
argues—that McKay Products and Brown Shoe support the 
position that the Incentive Program grants were contributions 
to BrokerTec’s capital because they were relocation 
inducements.  See BrokerTec Holdings, Inc., 2019 WL 
1545724, at *13–14 (concluding that the facts of McKay 
Products and Brown Shoe are “strikingly similar” in that in 
both “the localities sought to induce the taxpayers in question 
to move to their respective localities”); BrokerTec Br. 25–26 
(“Brown Shoe teaches . . . [that] location inducement grants 
like these are contributions to capital.”).  But, importantly, 
neither McKay Products nor Brown Shoe involved cash grants 
that were entirely unrestricted in use and calculated on the basis 
of wages paid rather than on the basis of the amount spent to 
relocate.  McKay Products involved the contribution of a 
factory, rather than cash, and thus the contribution was of a 
capital asset.  See 178 F.2d at 642.  And while Brown Shoe 
involved the contribution of both land and cash without any 
explicit restriction on its use, the Court specifically noted that 
“[i]n every instance the cash received by [the company] from 
a community group was less than the amount expended by it 
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for the acquisition or construction of the local factory building 
and equipment.”  339 U.S. at 587.  We agree with the 
Commissioner that this was an implicit restriction: the 
company in Brown Shoe “was effectively required to invest the 
funds (or a like amount) in its permanent working capital 
structure.”  Comm’r’s Br. 31. 
 
In sum, the cases from which the first CB&Q 
characteristic was distilled—Edwards, Texas & Pacific 
Railway, McKay Products, and Brown Shoe—support the 
Commissioner’s position that unrestricted cash grants, 
calculated on the basis of the recipient’s payment of wages, are 
not contributions to capital but rather are supplements to the 
company’s income. 
V. 
Our reading of these cases is also consistent with more 
recent decisions from two of our sister circuits.  See AT&T, Inc. 
v. United States, 629 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Coastal Utils., Inc., 483 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (S.D. Ga. 2007), 
aff’d, 514 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam adopting the 
district court’s opinion in full).  At issue in both cases were 
payments made by the federal and state governments to 
telephone companies that provided service to certain high-cost 
and low-income users in an effort to enable the companies to 
provide services to those users while remaining competitive in 
the market.  AT&T, 629 F.3d at 507; Coastal Utils., 483 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1234.  In both cases the Court concluded that the 
government payments were not contributions to the company’s 
capital but taxable income.  AT&T, 629 F.3d at 520; Coastal 
Utils., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1250–51.  In so holding, they 
reasoned that the government payments were not restricted to 
use as capital, and they were calculated based on operational 
expenses.  See AT&T, 629 F.3d at 517 (explaining that, “like 
the payments at issue in Texas & Pacific Railway, the 
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[government payments at issue] can be used for the payment 
of a wide variety of expenses,” and “[t]herefore, the . . . 
payments are not excludable from . . . income as 
nonshareholder contributions to capital under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 118”); Coastal Utilities, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1243 
(“Because the amount of payments takes into consideration a 
wide range of operational expenses, the payments are not 
solely for capital purposes.”). 
 
BrokerTec argues that Coastal Utilities and AT&T are 
distinguishable because neither case involved government 
payments to induce a company to relocate, like the Incentive 
Program grants.  We disagree.  They illustrate that, for 
government payments to “become a permanent part of the 
transferee’s working capital structure,” as required by CB&Q, 
412 U.S. at 413, they must in some way be designated for use 
as capital—whether by an explicit restriction on the use of the 
funds, or by tying the amount of funds to the amount of a 
capital investment required of the company.  Otherwise, the 
government payments are merely intended as supplements to 
income.  That rule applies regardless whether the payments 
were made to encourage the recipient to provide service to 
additional customers, as in AT&T and Coastal Utilities, or to 
induce the recipient to relocate, as in McKay Products, Brown 
Shoe, and this case.  The Tax Court failed to appreciate that 
this rule applies even in the case of relocation-incentive 
payments. 
VI. 
 Having concluded that the Tax Court’s decision was 
based on a misperception of the law, we must “decide whether 
to remand the case to that court for clarification of the basis of 
its determination or, alternatively, whether to decide the 
primarily factual issue ourselves.”  Bedrosian, 912 F.3d at 152.  
“In general, the proper course will be remand unless the record 
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permits only one resolution of the factual issue.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 When viewed in light of the law as set out above, the 
record here permits only one resolution: New Jersey’s 
Incentive Program grants to BrokerTec were intended as a 
supplement to its income rather than as a contribution to its 
capital.  It is undisputed that New Jersey placed no restriction 
on how the Incentive Program grants could be used: they could 
be used to make capital improvements, but they could also be 
used for operational expenses such as paying wages, or even 
paying dividends to shareholders.  And it also undisputed that 
the amount of the grants was not tied to the amount of capital 
improvements BrokerTec would make.  Indeed, while 
BrokerTec indicated in its Incentive Program applications that 
it would make $72 million in capital investments (in the form 
of improvements to office space, and the acquisition of 
technology and furniture), the total amount of Incentive 
Program grants was based on a percentage of income tax 
withholdings generated by BrokerTec’s employees and totaled 
approximately $170 million.  In light of these facts, BrokerTec 
cannot show that New Jersey intended the Incentive Program 
payments to “become a permanent part of [BrokerTec’s] 
working capital structure.”  CB&Q, 412 U.S. at 413.  
*    *    *    *    * 
For the reasons set out above, we reverse the ruling of 
the Tax Court.   
